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ABSTRACT
The recent SNC-Lavalin scandal and its political fallout have drawn
public attention to an existing culture of impunity enjoyed by corporate
criminal wrongdoers, despite the 2004 changes to the Criminal Code of
Canada that intended to make corporate prosecutions easier. In this article,
I argue that the conceptual problems with corporate criminal liability may
lie in the criminal justice system’s general misapprehension of the nature of
corporate crime; especially of the distinct nature of the harm experienced
by white collar victims. I further argue that, therefore, part of the solution
to under-enforcement may be evidentiary: the Crown and courts should,
where applicable, allow and particularly, encourage the victims of corporate
crime to testify at sentencing hearings, on the occasions that corporations
do go to trial. This will increase public awareness of the harms suffered by
corporate victims and may thus increase support for greater enforcement
generally, through both prosecutions and plea bargains. Finally, I consider
the challenges to a victim-oriented understanding of corporate crime posed
by the introduction of the remediation agreement in Canada. I compare the
Canadian context to that of the United States — where deferred
prosecutions agreements have long been in use and long caused such
problems — to suggest how these problems may be avoided given the
differences between the two countries’ substantive law on corporate crime.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

n 2007, Hamilton couple Norman and Georgette Hawe, now in their
80s, placed $450,000, the sum of both of their life savings, into an
investment plan managed by an entity called Golden Gate Funds.1
They were told that their money would be invested in a portfolio of
mortgages, but Golden Gate diverted it for other purposes instead. The
Hawes lost their savings and instead of retiring in comfort, they were forced
to sell their home. “I started working when I was 21 years old,” Norman
Hawe told the Globe and Mail in 2013, “I did a job for this guy from
Hamilton here, and he owed me $400. And he wouldn’t pay me. ... So, you
know what I did? I went up and I stuck a knife in his four tires. And this, I
lost $450,000, and I haven’t done anything.”2 The inaction Hawe refers to
is actually the government’s. The Golden Gate case never came before a
criminal court, but it did come before the Ontario Securities Commission
(OSC), which can only impose monetary penalties. In 2009, Golden Gate’s
owner, Ernest Anderson, settled with the OSC, acknowledged his
misrepresentations to investors, and agreed to a $4.7 million fine, which he
never paid.
The Hawes’ story may not exactly echo down the corridors of power,
but it does reveal a certain background lack of attention to white-collar
misconduct that set the stage for what has become one of the greatest
political scandals in Canadian history. A former federal Attorney General,
Jody Wilson-Raybould, contends that she was pressured by Justin Trudeau’s
Office of the Prime Minister to offer construction giant SNC-Lavalin a
remediation agreement that would allow it to avoid criminal conviction
under section 380 of the Criminal Code3 and the Corruption of Foreign Public
Officials Act (CFPOA),4 in connection with its alleged payment of $48
1

2
3
4

Jeff Gray & Janet McFarland, “Crime Without Punishment: Canada’s Investment
Fraud Problem”, The Globe and Mail (24 August 2013), online: <www.theglobeandmail.
com/report-on-business> [perma.cc/SSZ2-WE7J].
Ibid.
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 380 [Criminal Code].
Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, SC 1998, c 34.
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million in bribes to Libyan government officials.5 While SNC-Lavalin ended
up unsuccessful in its attempt to secure an agreement, its extensive lobbying
efforts have been cited as the impetus for Parliament adopting the
remediation agreement mechanism in the first place,6 in the 2018
amendments to the Criminal Code.7
While the political aspects of the SNC-Lavalin affair have struck a
particularly sharp note of outrage in the public at large, the company’s
misconduct arose in the same context that saw the Hawes’ lost retirement
savings go unpunished: the Crown’s under-enforcement of white-collar
crime and, in particular, its reluctance to bring criminal charges against
corporations. Indeed, SNC-Lavalin is unique insofar as it was charged. Since
the introduction, in 2004, of statutory corporate criminal liability under
sections 22.1 and 22.2 of the Criminal Code, very few corporations have
faced criminal charges.8 While this suggests that corporate giants like SNCLavalin have reason to believe they may engage in large-scale corruption with
impunity, it also means that smaller victims of corporate crime receive little
or no protection from the criminal justice system.9 And, there is at least
some reason to believe that such victims exist: according to a 2012 survey
by the British Columbia Securities Commission, 17% of Canadians over
age 50 believe they have been the victim of investment fraud at some point
in their lives and 29% of active investors so believe.10 Furthermore, the
Crown has brought only a handful of charges against corporate employers
(none of them major industry players) under the new Criminal Code
provisions, specifically intended to address criminal negligence in workplace
5

6
7
8

9

10

See “What the SNC-Lavalin Scandal Reveals About Corporate Influence on Canadian
Democracy”, CBC Radio (15 February 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/radio/day6/episode429-snc-lavalin-s-lobbying-> [perma.cc/7758-W6S5].
Ibid.
Criminal Code, supra note 3, Part XXII.1, “Remediation Agreements”.
See Norm Keith, Corporate Crime, Accountability, and Social Responsibility in Canada, 2nd
ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2016); Lincoln Caylor & Nathan Sheehan,
“Canadian Corporate Criminal Liability” (18 March 2019), online: Mondaq <www.mon
daq.com/canada/Criminal-Law> [perma.cc/J67G-QX9X].
White collar offenses are, of course, frequently prosecuted administratively — by the
Securities Commissions as in the Golden Gate case and by other relevant bodies such
as provincial Occupational Health and Safety agencies. For example, Alberta
Occupational Health and Safety investigated 23 workplace fatalities in 2012 and 27 in
2011. See Wayne Renke, Book Review of Still Dying for a Living: Corporate Criminal
Liability after the Westray Mine Disaster by Steven Bittle, (2014) 51:3 Alta L Rev 677.
See Gray & MacFarland, supra note 1.
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conditions, despite the numerous workplace deaths that have occurred since
their addition.11 And, since the adoption of the CFPOA in 1999, only four
companies have been convicted for corruption, compared to the nearly 200
convicted during the same time in the U.S. under the parallel Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA).12 Even scaling for the respective sizes of the
jurisdictions, it is unlikely that this disparity reflects an underlying
difference in actual levels of corruption. Given the global
interconnectedness of the economy, Canadian corporations are competing
in the same markets as their American counterparts and thus, they are
subject to the same pressures that encourage corrupt business practices.
This article does not attempt to solve the entire problem of white-collar
criminal under-enforcement or even to debate the merits of Parliament’s
decision to introduce remediation agreements into this legal landscape.
Instead, it argues that victim testimony at sentencing has an important role
to play against the conceptual hurdles that may deter corporate prosecution.
Because a corporation cannot go to jail, it may not seem, from a retributive
standpoint, to be an attractive target for scarce prosecutorial resources. I
argue that the conceptual problems with corporate criminal liability lie in
the criminal justice system’s general misapprehension of the nature of
corporate crime; especially of the distinct nature of the harm experienced
by corporate victims. Prosecutors should, in making charging decisions,
attend to this harm through interaction with corporate victims. And, both
prosecutors and courts should, where applicable, encourage the victims of
corporate crime to testify at sentencing hearings on the rare occasions when
corporations do go to trial. To the extent that the media circulates these
victim stories, they will raise public awareness of the human costs of whitecollar crime which will create a stronger public mandate for white collar
enforcement generally.
11

12

See Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety, “Westray Bill (Bill C-45)Overview” (last modified 5 May 2020), online: <www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/legisl/billc
45.html> [perma.cc/6Q8R-Z8ER]; Steven Bittle, Still Dying for a Living: Corporate
Criminal Liability after the Westray Mine Disaster (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) at 31–
34, citing R v Metron Construction Corporation, 2012 ONCJ 506; R v Scrocca, 2010 QCCQ
8218. See also R v Transpavé Inc, 2008 QCCQ 1598; R v Pétroles Global Inc, 2012 QCCQ
5749.
See Joanna Harrington, “SNC-Lavalin Case Shows Why We Should Review Canada’s
Corruption Laws” (26 February 2019), online: The Conversation <theconversation.com/
snc-lavalin-case> [perma.cc/3358-DQJ5]; US, Securities and Exchange Commission,
SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases (Washington, DC: SEC, last modified 9 January
2020), online: <www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml> [perma.cc/338G-JF6L].
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I proceed in four parts. In Part II, I give an overview of the common law
and statutory basis for corporate criminal liability in Canada — including its
historical origins in public outcry over harm to victims — and the major
scholarly questions it raises. In Part III, I collect evidence suggesting that
some of the harm suffered by victims of corporate crime is psychological and
it arises directly from the corporate nature of the criminal — above and
beyond the direct physical and economic harms that may also be properly
attributed to individual human employees. In Part IV, I describe the
evidentiary and constitutional bases on which the Crown may lead victim
impact evidence during sentencing and argue that such evidence is highly
probative of the nature of corporate criminal harm. I suggest that such
evidence enhances the expressive function of the criminal law by resolving
its conceptual disconnect around the idea of corporate criminal liability that
contributes to under-enforcement. Specifically, victim impact statements
given in one trial, if disseminated by the media, may serve to increase public
understanding of corporate harm as criminal and contribute to a mandate
for future enforcement. Finally, in Part V, I consider the problems for a
victim-oriented understanding of corporate crime posed by the introduction
of the remediation agreement to Canada. I compare the Canadian context
to that of the United States — where deferred prosecution agreements
(DPAs) have long been in use and long caused such problems — to make
suggestions for how best to avoid them, given the differences between the
two countries’ substantive law on corporate crime.

II. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN CANADA: AN
OVERVIEW
Corporate criminal liability has common law origins in Canada13 and
was formally recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in 1985 in
R v Canadian Dredge and Dock Co.14 In that case, the Court adopted the
English “identification theory” of corporate criminal mens rea, which allows
13

14

See R v Fane Robinson Ltd, [1941] 3 DLR 409, 76 CCC 196 (Alta SC (AD)), Ford JA for
the majority; R v JJ Beamish Construction Co Ltd et al, [1966] 2 OR 867, 59 DLR (2d) 6
(Ont SC), Jessup J, as he then was; R v St Lawrence Corp Ltd, [1969] 2 OR 305, 5 DLR
(3d) 263 (Ont CA), Schroeder J for the Court; R v Parker Car Wash Systems Ltd (1977), 35
CCC (2d) 37, 1 BLR 213 (Ont SC), Hughes J; R v PG Marketplace Ltd (1979), 51 CCC
(2d) 185, 4 WCB 98 (BCCA), Nemetz CJ for the majority.
[1985] 1 SCR 662, 19 DLR (4th) 314.
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a corporation to be criminally liable only where the government can identify
a so-called “directing mind” of the company — an individual “officer or
managerial-level employee”— who possesses the requisite degree of mens rea
required for the given criminal offence.15 The identification theory
“produces the element of mens rea in the corporate entity, otherwise absent
from the legal entity but present in the natural person, the directing mind”
and therefore “establishes the ‘identity’ between the directing mind and the
corporation which results in the corporation being found guilty for the act of
the natural person, the employee.”16 This rule differs sharply from the
principle of respondeat superior which the United States Supreme Court
imported from tort law to define the due process limits to corporate criminal
liability in the controversial 1909 New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v
United States case.17 Under respondeat superior, the crime of any employee
exposes the corporate employer to criminal liability and poses the risk of
criminalizing corporations for the actions of rogue, low-level employees, even
when they act against corporate policy.
Respondeat superior has been widely criticized, in the U.S. and abroad for
running afoul of the principle that criminal punishment should track with
actual culpability; its potential for punishing non-guilty entities — even nonnegligent entities — is clear.18 Canada has, therefore, rejected the doctrine, as
summarized in the Government Response to the Fifteenth Report on the
Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Corporate Liability:
The Government [of Canada] shares the concerns expressed by many witnesses that
vicarious liability as applied in the United States is contrary to the principles that
underlie Canada’s criminal law. While its rigours are somewhat attenuated by the
United States Sentencing Guidelines which allow for reductions in the prescribed fine
in accordance with the corporation’s culpability score, many would argue that under
Canadian law it would be wrong in principle to impose the stigma of a criminal
conviction on a corporation when its actions are not morally blameworthy.19

If respondeat superior runs the risk of over-criminalization, however, the
identification theory carries the opposite risk. Under the rule of Canadian
15
16
17
18

19

Ibid at 682.
Ibid.
212 US 481 at 493–95 (1909).
See e.g. John Hasnas, “The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate
Criminal Liability” (2009) 46:4 Am Crim L Rev 1329 at 1339.
Canada, Department of Justice, Government Response to the Fifteenth Report of the Standing
Committee on Justice and Human Rights (Ottawa: DOJ, November 2002), online: <www.ju
stice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/jhr-jdp/hear-aud.html> [perma.cc/PE3D-NTKD].
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Dredge and Dock, a corporation may be prosecuted only on proof that a member
of the board of directors, an officer, or a senior manager has the mens rea to
commit a particular offence. This would necessarily make it very difficult for
the Crown to bring charges in cases where (a) a generally lax corporate culture
emboldens lower level employees to commit crimes in the course of
employment or (b) systemic breakdowns in internal controls lead to grossly
negligent conduct that jeopardizes the public.
It did not take long for both to occur spectacularly enough to raise public
awareness of the shortcomings of identification theory. On May 9, 1992,
during the last hours of their four-day shift, 26 miners perished in a methane
explosion at the Westray Mine in Plymouth, Nova Scotia.20 The mine had
opened only eight months previously, after Toronto company, Curraugh
Resources, Inc. won both federal and provincial money for the project, which
was touted as destined to revitalize the economically-depressed Pictou County.
Political pressure from both Ottawa and Halifax may explain why the mine
was permitted to operate despite a letter from the MLA, Bernie Boudreau, to
Nova Scotia Labour Minister Leroy Legere, alerting him to the fact that the
mine was using potentially dangerous methods unapproved for coal mining.21
Curraugh had obtained a special permit to use such methods to tunnel prior
to reaching the coal seam but not actually to mine coal, and Legere was
unaware that Curraugh continued to use them three months into the
mine’s operations.22 Furthermore, mine workers complained of cutbacks in
safety training and equipment and management’s negligent attitude toward
safety inspections. When miner Carl Guptill complained about these
conditions to Labour Ministry inspectors they did not investigate, and
Guptill was fired.23
After the disaster, the Nova Scotia government mounted an inquiry
conducted by Justice K Peter Richard, who concluded that the explosion
resulted from “incompetence… mismanagement… bureaucratic bungling…

20

21
22
23

Martin O’Malley, “Westray Remembered: Explosion Killed 26 N.S. Coal Miners in
1992”, CBC News (8 May 2012), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/westra
y-remembered-explosion-killed-26-n-s-coal-miners-in-1992-1.1240122> [perma.cc/4H7E
-XG8Z].
Ibid.
Ibid.
Caroline O’Conell & Albert J Mills, “The Westray Mine Explosion” in Emmanuel
Raufflet & Alfred J Mills, eds, The Dark Side: Critical Cases on the Downside of Business
(London, UK: Routledge, 2017) 162.
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deceit… ruthlessness… and… cynical indifference.”24 Specifically, Justice
Richard found that:
[T]he Westray operation defied the fundamental rules and principles of safe mining
practice… it clearly rejected industry standards, provincial regulations, codes of safe
practice, and common sense… Management failed to adopt and effectively promote a
safety ethic underground. Instead, management, through its actions and attitudes,
sent a different message — Westray was to produce coal at the expense of worker
safety.25

Despite its misconduct, Curraugh Resources (which went bankrupt in
1993) was never criminally charged.26 The Crown did attempt to prosecute
mine managers Gerald Phillips and Roger Parry for criminal negligence and
manslaughter, but the charges were eventually dropped due to insufficiency of
evidence.27 The identification theory effectively blocked criminal justice for the
victims of a large-scale, systemic breakdown that resulted in mass loss of life.
Whatever evidence might have existed that “directing minds” at Curraugh
were inappropriately pressuring the operators of Westray Mine to begin
production, it could not, apparently, be proven that any such person had all
of the requisite mental elements to state a case for homicide.
One way of stating the problem in the language of causation is that the
company was, collectively, guilty of gross negligence: no one in the company
took the requisite steps to mitigate the risks to its miners, created by its
operations. These omissions caused the deaths. Had an individual’s culpable
omissions caused human death, they would have been on the hook for
negligent homicide. But, because Curraugh was a corporation, there was no
way to charge it for the collective omissions of all of its employees taken
together.
The Westray explosion prompted widespread public outrage. After 12
years of lobbying, Parliament finally passed Bill C-45 (known as the “Westray
Bill”) in 2003.28 The Bill amended the Canadian Criminal Code in two ways.
24

25
26

27
28

Justice K Peter Richard, “Executive Summary: Report of the Westray Mine Public
Inquiry” (November 1997) at 3, online (pdf): <ece.uwaterloo.ca/~dwharder/epel/Lect
ure_materials/Westray.Mine.Public.Inquiry.pdf > [perma.cc/G5J2-VSHB].
Ibid at 23.
Michael McDonald, “Ceremony Marks the 25th Anniversary of Westray Mine Disaster
in Nova Scotia”, The Toronto Star (9 May 2017), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canad
a/2017/05/09/ceremony-marks-25th-anniversary-of-westray-mine-disaster-in-nova-scoti
a.html> [perma.cc/94ZT-QN6S].
Ibid.
Bill C- 45, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Criminal Liability of Organizations), 2nd
Sess, 37th Parl, 2003 (as passed by the House of Commons 7 November 2003).
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First, it added section 217.1, creating a duty for workplace supervisors to take
reasonable steps to prevent bodily harm to their subordinates, the omission to
perform which would trigger liability in criminal negligence.29 More
dramatically, it statutorily superseded the identification theory of Canadian
Dredge, expanding the circumstances under which entities may be criminally
liable for the crimes of their employees.30 Section 22.1 applies to crimes
premised on criminal negligence and section 22.2 applies to crimes premised
on subjective mens rea/fault.31 Under Section 22.1 an entity is liable for
criminal negligence if:
(a) acting within the scope of their authority
(i) one of its representatives is a party to the offence, or
(ii) two or more of its representatives engage in conduct, whether by act or
omission, such that, if it had been the conduct of only one representative, that
representative would have been a party to the offence; and
(b) the senior officer who is responsible for the aspect of the organization’s
activities that is relevant to the offence departs — or the senior officers, collectively,
depart — markedly from the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could
reasonably be expected to prevent a representative of the organization from being
a party to the offence.32

Under section 22.2 an entity is liable for a fault-based offence when:
22.2 … with the intent at least in part to benefit the organization, one of its senior
officers
(a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence;
(b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and acting
within the scope of their authority, directs the work of other representatives of
the organization so that they do the act or make the omission specified in the
offence; or
(c) knowing that a representative of the organization is or is about to be a party
to offence, does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from being a
party to the offence.33

These new Criminal Code provisions expand liability beyond that
allowed by the identification theory, as they allow the criminal conduct or
negligence of any level of employee to create corporate liability under certain
29
30
31
32
33

Ibid.
Ibid.
Criminal Code, supra note 3, ss 22.1, 22.2.
Ibid, s 22.1.
Ibid, s 22.2.
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circumstances, so long as there is also some sort of failure of oversight at the
senior-officer level. Nonetheless, these provisions are somewhat
complicated in the number of moving evidentiary parts that a prosecutor
must juggle to prove them.
In the first place, it took some time for courts to sort out who, exactly,
counts as a senior officer; recent cases have held that the category includes
both regional managers and independent agents who manage an important
aspect of a corporation’s activities.34 These rulings have confirmed the fact
that the new provisions do indeed expand the scope of corporate criminal
liability beyond the actions of the board and the c-suite; a senior officer need
not have policy-making authority, merely operational authority.35 However,
compared to the rigors of the respondeat superior standard, the Criminal Code
provisions appear to allow an affirmative defence based on “reasonable
measures taken by senior officers” with respect to the business units under
their supervision.36 At the time of Bill C-45’s passage, some scholars were
optimistic that it improved upon the common law by allowing a court to
“view corporate decision-making on a collective, rather than an individual
basis,” when “because of the fragmentation in decision-making in modern
corporations” it is “hard to point to a single individual and say that his or
her decisions show a marked departure from the standard of care.”37
Despite the promise of these new Criminal Code provisions on paper,
critics of corporate criminal under-enforcement note that they have failed
to change what is, in essence, a problem of prosecutorial culture. Steven
Bittle argues that prosecutors continue to treat corporations differently
from street offenders.38 While the government pursues street crime using a
punitive, deterrence-based approach, it prefers a “compliance” model for
corporate criminals, focusing on education and voluntary remediation first,
with prosecution as a last resort.39 Bittle argues that, given their profit
incentives to do so, corporations will attempt to circumvent compliance-

34

35

36
37

38
39

See R v Pétroles Global Inc, 2013 QCCS 4262; R v Metron Construction Corp, 2013 ONCA
541.
See Todd Archibald, Ken Jull & Kent Roach, “Corporate Criminal Liability: Myriad
Complexity in the Scope of Senior Officer” (2014) 60:3 Crim LQ 386 at 390.
Ibid at 388.
Darcy L MacPherson, “Extending Corporate Criminal Liability: Some Thoughts on Bill
C-45” (2003) 30:3 Man LJ 253 at 283.
See Bittle, supra note 11 at 46, 51.
Ibid.
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based enforcement through falsification and deceit.40 While Bittle’s critique
of corporate motives may prove a bit too much — assuming, as it does,
universally bad motivations on the part of business entities — his description
of the under-enforcement problem rings true. If the democratically enacted
Criminal Code provides for corporate criminal liability, it is undemocratic
for the Crown to largely ignore it relative to the crimes of individuals.

III. THE PERCEPTUAL HARMS OF CORPORATE CRIME
Part of my argument in this paper is that the lack of corporate criminal
enforcement flows from a fundamental, theoretical incoherence in the
justification for corporate criminal liability. It has been well documented,
particularly in the context of sexual assault, that prosecutors charge more
frequently when they understand the nature of the harm at issue in a
particular class of offence.41 Furthermore, while the criminal law does not,
itself, appear to create new moral norms among the public at large, it
appears to strengthen existing norms and, thus, contributes to an increased
public mandate for enforcement.42 The combined effect of these two
phenomena means that optimal enforcement depends on a clear
understanding, among prosecutors and the public at large, of what the
nature of a particular criminal harm is.
The existence of corporate criminal liability faces a number of
conceptual attacks, as a corporation can feel neither remorse nor the shame
of criminal stigma, nor can it be incarcerated.43 Utilitarian scholars have
further suggested that criminally punishing corporations results in a net loss
to society by over-deterring beyond the existing disincentives created by civil

40
41

42

43

Ibid at 51, 152.
See e.g. Jeffrey W Spears & Cassia C Spohn, “The Genuine Victim and Prosecutors’
Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases” (1996) 20:2 American J Crim Justice 183
at 192–96; Darryl K Brown, “Criminal Enforcement Redundancy: Oversight of
Decisions Not to Prosecute” (2018) 103:2 Minn L Rev 843 at 857–59.
Michael C Harper, “Comment on the Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later”
(1996) 76:1/2 BUL Rev 23 at 25.
See e.g. Hasnas, supra note 18 at 1339; William S Laufer, “Corporate Bodies and Guilty
Minds” (1994) 43:2 Emory LJ 647 at 655; Gerhard OW Mueller, “Mens Rea and the
Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal
Liability” (1957) 19:1 U Pitt L Rev 21 at 41–46.
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and regulatory liability.44 In the Canadian context, with Westray looming
so large as a backdrop, Norm Keith warns that “the history of accountability
of corporations has often been directed by crisis and ‘moral panic’ more
than by reasoned, logical application of legal responsibility.”45 Keith further
contends that the impersonal, “faceless” attributes of a corporation make it
particularly susceptible to moral panic through manipulations by the media
and public officials searching for scapegoats.46
On the other side, proponents of corporate criminal liability argue,
essentially, that corporations do really bad things: they engage in harmful
conduct with ill effects on health, environment, worker safety, and so
forth.47 Yet, this does not adequately address the critics’ arguments. After
all, if such bad things can be causally attributed to individual human
employees, then those employees can be prosecuted alone; if not, perhaps
such bad things cannot, consistent with principles of justice, be criminally
punished because they cannot be attributed to a particular offender. I argue,
instead, for a different justification, premised on the fact that when a
corporation commits a crime, it imposes a distinct set of harms on its victims
and, by proxy, on society — above and beyond the substantive harms caused
by the offence — that flow from the nature of the corporate entity itself.48 A
focus on victims can help prosecutors better understand these harms and
victim impact statements can transmit them to the public.
The Criminal Code has long recognized harm to victims as a sentencing
factor in both individual and corporate prosecutions. Section 718.1 of the
Criminal Code states that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the
gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender; a
factor in this proportionality calculus is the harm caused to a victim arising
from the commission of the offence.49 Scholars note some of the unique
44

45

46
47

48

49

See e.g. Daniel R Fischel & Alan O Sykes, “Corporate Crime” (1996) 25:2 J Leg Stud
319; VS Khanna, “Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?” (1996)
109:7 Harv L Rev 1477.
Norm Keith, “Evolution of Corporate Accountability: From Moral Panic to Corporate
Social Responsibility” (2010) 11:3 Bus L Intl 247 at 247.
Ibid at 260.
See e.g. Pamela H Bucy, “Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make Sense?”
(2009) 46:4 Am Crim L Rev 1437.
See Erin Sheley, “Perceptual Harm and the Corporate Criminal” (2012) 81:1 U Cin L
Rev 225 at 228.
Criminal Code, supra note 3, s 718.1; Allan Manson, The Law of Sentencing (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2001) at 84–92.
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aspects to the relationship between a victim and a corporate offender. As a
point in favor of Bill C-45, Archibald, Jull, and Roach note that:
From the victim’s perspective (or in a case such as Westray, the families of victims),
if it can be shown that criminal activity occurred, it matters not which level of
management authorized it…. [t]his dichotomy [between policy-makers and
operators] is viewed as a way of isolating the board of directors and the
corporation.50

On the other hand, Norm Keith points out the potential difficulties in
identifying the victims of a particular corporate offence, which might be
obvious in cases of fraud against a particular group of shareholders, but
harder to determine in cases of mass bacterial infections resulting from
corporate action assisted by a provincial government’s failure to meet clean
water regulatory requirements.51
Just as sentencing courts focus on the degree of harm caused by
particular corporations, prosecutors should charge more corporations in the
first place due to the kinds of harms corporations cause their victims. In
addition to the obvious material harms — which may vary as between
economic, environmental, physical, etc. depending on the offence — there
is a separate class of harms common to those types of corporate crime with
discernible victims. I call these “perceptual harms”.52 Perceptual harms
amount to the empirically demonstrated sense of helplessness a victim feels
when faced with a perpetrator that is temporally enduring, powerful, and
materially complex.53 When a corporate offender continues to exist after it
commits a crime, it can shatter a victim’s “belief in a just world”:54 a
psychological heuristic crucial to a person’s wellbeing. This is a unique sort
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of harm flowing from the corporate structure itself.55
As an example, consider the long-term sociological and psychological
costs of a corporate environmental crime.56 The psychological literature has
documented a particular sort of harm in victims of the major oil spills of
the last several decades: evidence suggests the psychological harm
experienced by victims to be exacerbated by the corporate nature of the
responsible entities and issues related to assignation of blame. In addition
to the immediate physical losses suffered by the victims of technological
disaster, the victims’ communities also suffer a long-term social
deterioration described as “the corrosive community”.57 The literature
attributes part of this corrosive effect to the members of a community
struggling over where to place blame, authorities being evasive and
unresponsive, and victims becoming suspicious and cynical.58
Psychologist Deborah du Nann Winter, whose expertise centers on the
psychological effects of environmental damage, has observed from her
studies of victims of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill that the primary
emotional reaction among these victims is “anger… around the oil
companies’ failure to abide by regulations” as well as “helplessness” (which
she explains by noting the phenomenon of “learned helplessness,” which is
the tendency of organisms to become non-responsive in the face of
situations over which they have no control).59 Again, the structural
relationship between the corporation and the background legal authority
that supports it can be directly linked to the psychological damage
experienced by victims. I now turn to the evidentiary mechanism by which
prosecutors who understand the nature of the perceptual harm experienced
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by corporate victims may use that knowledge to increase and mobilize
existing public support for white-collar prosecutions.

IV. THE EVIDENTIARY ROLE OF VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
The crime victim’s rights as a stakeholder in the Canadian criminal
justice system have long been recognized60 and, as mentioned previously,
sentencing courts must consider the degree of harm to victims in applying
the proportionality principle expressed in section 718.1 of the Criminal
Code.61 In 1988, the federal and provincial ministers responsible for
criminal justice endorsed the Canadian Statement of Basic Principles of Justice
for Victims of Crime, “in recognition that all persons have the full protection
of rights guaranteed by the [Charter]” and “the rights of victims and
offenders need to be balanced.”62 They have recently been the focus of
greater attention with the passage of the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights in
2015.63 The Bill provides the victim with a range of rights, including to be
apprised of the status of the investigation of and proceedings against their
offender and certain rights of privacy and security. It also provides that
“[e]very victim has the right to present a victim impact statement to the
appropriate authorities in the criminal justice system and to have it
considered.”64 The right to present a victim impact statement had existed
long before the Bill of Rights; it became statutory with earlier amendments
to the Criminal Code in 198865 and enhanced with additional amendments
in 1999. Currently, subsection 722(1) of the Criminal Code provides:
When determining the sentence to be imposed on an offender or determining
whether the offender should be discharged under section 730 in respect of any
offence, the court shall consider any statement of a victim prepared in accordance
with this section and filed with the court describing the physical or emotional
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harm, property damage or economic loss suffered by the victim as the result of the
commission of the offence and the impact of the offence on the victim.66

Prosecutors should pay closer attention to the particular impacts of
corporate crime on its victims and use that understanding to promote the
role of the victim in corporate prosecutions. Specifically, where prosecutors
can identify victims, they should encourage them to read victim impact
statements (VIS) during corporate sentencing proceedings as frequently as
they do in cases of violent crime. This would begin to break down the
conceptual barrier between corporate and individual crime, which may
obscure the criminal nature of corporate conduct and also better link the
project of criminalizing corporations to some version of the harm
principle,67 as opposed to goals of prosecutorial economy.
This argument raises initial questions, based on what we know so far
about how VIS operate in the criminal justice system. While there does not
appear to be recent empirical data on this question, it seems that only a
distinct minority of victims avail themselves of the opportunity to make
such statements.68 A 1990 study found that victims’ rate of refusal to give a
statement was twice as high in cases of property crime as opposed to other
sorts of crime.69 Furthermore, a study of the effect of victim impact
statements on actual sentencing outcomes in Calgary found no discernible
impact on actual sentence.70 Reviewing this rather inconclusive data, Julian
Roberts concluded that “[w]e cannot exclude the possibility that VIS have
had limited impact on victims’ satisfaction in large measure because of the
way in which they have been conceptualized, operationalized and
administered” and on that basis called for “a clearer and consensual vision
of the nature and function of a VIS.”71
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Perhaps the biggest challenge to making good use of VIS is that prior
research suggests courts are uncertain as to precisely what end they are
supposed to “consider” them when making sentencing determinations.72
More recently, Marie Manikis has conducted a review of appellate court
decisions to attempt to answer this question.73 She finds that some courts
recognize that VIS provide information about the harm which serves as
either an aggravating or mitigating factor in sentencing.74 Other courts,
however, suggest that VIS are supposed to serve a purely expressive purpose
and should not affect sentencing outcomes at all.75
Other scholars fear that VIS increase the systemic injustice of criminal
law. Susan Bandes fears that they mobilize negative emotions against the
defendant: they “evoke not merely sympathy, pity, and compassion for the
victim, but also a complex set of emotions directed toward the defendant,
including hatred, fear, racial animus, vindictiveness, undifferentiated
vengeance, and the desire to purge collective anger.”76 She argues that they
shift the focus away from the defendant’s moral culpability and toward “a
thirst for undifferentiated vengeance.”77 She also believes that the narratives
developed during the guilt phase of the trial are already stacked against the
defendant by the time that sentencing takes place.78 Martha Minow opposes
victim evidence for fear that it will encourage dueling victim narratives
between the victim and defendant; she urges that the system adopt
normative standards for evaluating “historical” harm experienced by
oppressed groups, as opposed to individuals.79 Jennifer Culbert sees VIS as
inappropriately establishing the suffering of the victim as an
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incontrovertible basis for deciding punishment in an otherwise pluralistic
and morally relativistic society.80
While these are all valid and important concerns, such arguments rely
heavily on a bi-lateral view of sentencing in which the victim’s only function
is to oppose the interests of the defendant. Indeed, many popular arguments
in favour of VIS rely on similar, but symmetrically opposite, grounds: we
should prioritize the victim’s individual needs over the defendant’s by
allowing VIS.81 Manikis proposes that we create a balance between
presumably victim-focused expressive goals (which she characterizes
primarily as allowing for the release of emotion) and the instrumental goal
of informing the sentencing court about actual harm.82 She would allow the
victim to speak broadly, even to make “emotional outbursts” for expressive
purposes, but would require the court to “discard the part unrelated to harm
when crafting and deciding the severity of a sentence.”83
I have argued elsewhere that the current debate on the victim’s
participation in the criminal sentencing process ignores how the complexity
of a victim narrative effectively conveys to the sentencing body the
community’s experience of harm, without which the criminal justice system
loses its legitimacy as a penal authority.84 This full account of public harm
is crucial to the retributive function of sentencing and if it is excluded, the
system risks perceptions of illegitimacy.85 The narrative features of VIS work
to make a victim’s harm accessible to a listener and, because these victim
stories also circulate through society outside of the courtroom, they shape
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social norms about culpability.86 If the sentencing process cannot
accommodate victim stories it risks illegitimacy in the eyes of a society
guided by these norms.87 It also risks allowing undifferentiated stereotypes,
developed by political and media actors, to take the place of individuated
victim accounts in the mind of a fact-finder.88 This argument, of course,
relates to the retributive function of VIS within a criminal trial and the
importance of what such statements convey to the sentencing body itself —
what Manikis would refer to as their “instrumental” function.
But VIS also have an external or expressive function, which the rise of
social media has compounded by transmitting unmediated trial narratives
through public spaces that they have not penetrated in the past.89 This
“expressive” function is more complex than simply serving, as Manikis
conceives of it, as a therapeutic opportunity for victims to release emotion.
There is also a public expressive function to the criminal justice system. The
traditional media has long distorted public perceptions about crime and
punishment, thereby undermining the expressive function of criminal
justice.90 The traditional Marxist critique of the media asserts that those in
power manipulate the press to harness support for policies that criminalize
those with the least power in society.91 However, the “left realist” school of
criminology points out that the whole of public concern about crime is
hardly the product of false consciousness. There are quite rational reasons
to fear crime and many people, in fact, fear it due to direct interaction with
actual victims.92 Unmediated victim narratives have, therefore, always been
an important source of information about actual criminal harm, particularly
harm to victims ignored by the prevailing media account.
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So-called “viral” victim narratives about police violence attendant to the
Black Lives Matter movement, as well as the uniquely impactful victim
impact statement delivered by Jane Doe in the Stanford rape case, illustrate
how the expressive function of punishment has become even more critical
in light of “new” media.93 One could argue, of course, that victim narratives
can be disseminated without being first expressed during a formal
sentencing hearing — the police violence videos are a good example of this.
Yet, to the extent that institutions of justice support these narratives by
providing a forum for their expression and dissemination, the institutions
themselves are participating in what Anthony Duff describes as the
“communicative” purpose of punishment.94 Punishment sends a message to
the offender about their conduct, to the victim about their worth in the eyes
of the community, and to the community about what we morally require
from one another.95 The system serves this purpose better if it incorporates
unmediated victim narratives into this process.
The recent Calgary case of Carey and Cody Manyshots demonstrates
the interaction between VIS, social media, and the perceived legitimacy of
the justice system on the part of the general public. The Manyshots brothers
kidnapped a 17-year-old girl from a bus stop, kept her prisoner, and sexually
assaulted her repeatedly.96 Because the victim did not feel emotionally able
to read her statement aloud to the trial court, the Crown prosecutor asked
the court to exercise its discretion to allow the prosecutor to read the
statement on behalf of the victim.97 The Court refused and a local social
media firestorm followed.98 (A Facebook page linking to one article on the
topic had, two weeks after the decision, received 370 “reactions” and 133
comments.)
One representative commenter underscored the communal importance
of the VIS:
Ridiculous, the reason its [sic] called a victim impact statement is clear, so the
victim gets to share the pain and suffering that resulted from the crime. Judges
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should uphold that civic right as a part of our legal system no matter what. Taking
away the victims [sic] voice is as disgusting as taking away our freedom. I am
reinforced in my belief that judges, cops and prosecutors are totally indifferent to
the rights of the individual. They hold the balance of power and we are lead around
like cattle in a broken system.

By linking the idea of a silenced victim to a general loss of civic freedom,
this commenter emphasizes the expressive importance of such statements.
As Duff theorizes, they implicate not only the system’s obligation to
communicate to the victim its condemnation of his or her victimizer, but
to relay this message to the rest of the polity. The victim’s account of her
harm is not only an account of her individual harm but of how her
community itself has been harmed through the crime against her. While
fairness may require courts to exclude certain statements under certain
circumstances, it does so at the risk of negatively impacting public faith in
systemic legitimacy.
In sum, particularly in the era of “viral” social media content, VIS can
be used to vindicate the rights of the powerless against the powerful as easily
as they can be used to increase the punitiveness of the justice system against
certain defendants. And, in our status quo universe, in which VIS will
continue to be used in the latter capacity, there is arguably a greater moral
imperative to use them in the former as well. Corporate criminal
punishment provides an ideal setting for this endeavor. It is hard to think
of a greater power asymmetry than that existing between a corporate
defendant, on the one hand, and an individual human victim, on the other.
We do not have examples of many victim impact statements at
corporate criminal trials, but it is helpful to consider a couple of victim
narratives about corporate harm occurring in other formal settings.
Consider, for example, the victims of the 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster, in
which a coal slurry dam owned by the Pittston Corporation burst and
caused 125 citizens of Logan County, West Virginia to drown in black
sludge99 (additionally, the property destruction left 4,000 people
homeless).100 Despite the fact that the investigation determined that the
dam had violated numerous federal and state safety regulations, no
criminal charges were ever filed against the Pittston Corporation, its
subsidiary Buffalo Mining Co, or any of their officers. The citizens of the
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Buffalo Creek area formed a Citizens Commission to investigate the
disaster, which concluded:
We think that this coal company, Pittston, has murdered the people, and we call
upon the prosecuting attorney and the judge…to prosecute and bring to trial this
coal company…the fact of the matter is that these are all laws on the books which
the company felt completely free to ignore, which says something about the
relationship between coal companies and state governments…just this complete
freedom to ignore these laws with no fear of any kind of prosecution.101

These words make explicit the perceptual harms that corporate crime
imposes on its victims. The Buffalo Creek victims’ commission identified,
as part of the trauma the community had suffered, their comparative
helplessness relative to a company with (a) continued temporal existence and
(b) some sort of interrelationship with structures of state power.
Very similar themes appear in the congressional testimony of Keith
Jones, whose son Gordon died on the Deepwater Horizon: “TransOcean,
Halliburton, and any other company will be back because they have the
infrastructure and economic might to make more money. But Gordon will
never be back. Never. And neither will the 10 good men who died with
him.”102
Again, it is not only the loss of Gordon that Jones identifies here but
the asymmetry between that loss and the impossibility of an equivalent loss
on the side of an enduring entity like Halliburton. The disruption to the
belief-in-a-just-world heuristic, as discussed above, resulting from perceived
unfairness, appears in both of these accounts of suffering due to
unpunished or inadequately punished corporate crime.
These victim narratives draw attention to the sine qua non of a corporate
criminal act — to that which justifies punishing the institution itself above
and beyond the culpable individual actors that can and should also be
charged where possible. It is not just that the harm imposed by corporations
is severe. That can be true and yet, it can still be the case that punishing
both individual employees and the corporation is redundant if the latter is
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punished for the same harm as the former. The issue is that the psychic
harm posed by corporate crime is distinct in kind.
From these premises it becomes clear that victim narratives have the
potential to give coherence to a conceptually unstable area of the criminal
law. In the first place, the use of VIS at corporate sentencing provides
evidence of the distinctly corporate aspects of victim harm for a sentencing
body, whose job it is to dispense appropriate punishment. In the second,
where the Crown’s under-enforcement of the Criminal Code against
corporations may be a substantially cultural, rather than doctrinal, problem,
the expressive function of VIS may serve to reflect and enhance social norms
about corporate criminality and thereby bring popular demand for
corporate prosecutions more in line with that for individual criminals.

V. REMEDIATION AGREEMENTS AND CORPORATE VICTIMS: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The timing of this article renders it impossible to leave the topic of VIS
as evidence of corporate criminal harm in Canada without at least
considering the recent sea change in white-collar enforcement. In
September 2018, after many years of discussion and recent months of
lobbying, Parliament adopted amendments to the Criminal Code allowing
the Crown to use remediation agreements to resolve cases of organizational
misconduct. Modeled after the deferred prosecution agreement (DPA)
pioneered by the United States Department of Justice, remediation
agreements provide a mechanism for a corporation to settle a criminal
investigation without having to resort to a guilty plea.
According to section 715.31 of the Criminal Code, the agreements have
the following objectives:
(a) to denounce an organization’s wrongdoing and the harm that the wrongdoing
has caused to victims or to the community;
(b) to hold the organization accountable for its wrongdoing through effective,
proportionate and dissuasive penalties;
(c) to contribute to respect for the law by imposing an obligation on the
organization to put in place corrective measures and promote a compliance
culture;
(d) to encourage voluntary disclosure of the wrongdoing;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
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(f) to reduce the negative consequences of the wrongdoing for persons —
employees, customers, pensioners and others — who did not engage in the
wrongdoing, while holding responsible those individuals who did engage in that
wrongdoing.103

Subsection 715.32(2) instructs that prosecutors, in determining whether to
offer a remediation agreement, should consider the following factors:
(a) the circumstances in which the act or omission that forms the basis of the
offence was brought to the attention of investigative authorities;
(b) the nature and gravity of the act or omission and its impact on any victim;
(c) the degree of involvement of senior officers of the organization in the act or
omission;
(d) whether the organization has taken disciplinary action, including termination
of employment, against any person who was involved in the act or omission;
(e) whether the organization has made reparations or taken other measures to
remedy the harm caused by the act or omission and to prevent the commission of
similar acts or omissions;
(f) whether the organization has identified or expressed a willingness to identify
any person involved in wrongdoing related to the act or omission;
(g) whether the organization — or any of its representatives — was convicted of an
offence or sanctioned by a regulatory body, or whether it entered into a previous
remediation agreement or other settlement, in Canada or elsewhere, for similar
acts or omissions;
(h) whether the organization — or any of its representatives — is alleged to have
committed any other offences, including those not listed in the schedule to this
Part; and
(i) any other factor that the prosecutor considers relevant.104

Judging by the American experience with DPAs, this new addition has
the potential to exacerbate the under-enforcement problems discussed
above. In the U.S., the rise of the era of deferred and non-prosecution
agreements has meant that greater numbers of criminal corporations escape
formal criminal charges entirely, in exchange for paying fines and making
stipulated changes to internal governance.105 These agreements are
“mutually beneficial” to the extent that they make life easier for prosecutors,
who can avoid the massive discovery process involved in taking a
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corporation to trial, and for corporations, who can avoid the sting of
criminal conviction and its collateral effects (especially the risk of being
barred from business with the government), which was the major concern
of SNC-Lavalin.
While the U.S. Department of Justice’s official factors for determining
whether a corporation should be criminally charged include “the risk of
harm to the public” posed by the crime committed (and the reciprocal costs
of a prosecution to both the public and innocent third parties such as
employees), they also include such factors as “remedial efforts” and
“willingness to cooperate.”106 The prevalence of DPAs thus ties much of
federal criminal enforcement against corporations to the relative ease with
which the two sides can strike a bargain, as opposed to the degree of actual
harm to human victims. The use of DPAs and NPAs is not even consistent
across the DOJ: the Environment and Natural Resources Division and the
Antitrust Division rarely use them, while the Criminal Division and some
United States Attorney’s offices resort to them more often than not.107
The gap between the primary American substantive culpability standard
and the DOJ’s extremely nuanced factors to guide prosecutorial decisionmaking has created, what some scholars have referred to as, problems of
incongruence. As William Laufer and Alan Strudler put it:
First, forward problems emerge where changes in the general part of the law—
liability rules and culpability standards—are conceived without concern for how
punishment is crafted or justified. And reverse problems arise where standards for
punishment impose liability or culpability that conflict with extant law in theory
or practice.108

As Laufer and Strudler argue, the federal charging guidelines wholly
abandon the rule of respondeat superior and instead measure “features of the
corporate person,” particularly as measured by post-offence behaviour
which “may bear little correspondence to the underlying offence.”109 Other
scholars note that the massive increase in corporate cooperation with
criminal investigations has unintentionally blurred the line between the
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prosecuting government and the private entity being prosecuted.110 This
results in doctrinal problems such as as: the risk of corporations qualifying
as agents of the state for the purposes of Constitutional exclusionary rules;
the risk of undermining employees’ Fifth Amendment protections against
self-incrimination; the possibility of the government being deemed “in
control” of corporate documents for the purposes of discovery requests by
individual employees; and prosecutors acting “beyond their institutional
competence” by adopting corporate oversight roles.111
How all of these concerns shake out in Canadian doctrine remains, of
course, to be seen. It is encouraging that subsection 715.32(2)(b) specifically
mentions harm to victims as a relevant factor, which is not considered in
the U.S. Department of Justice’s charging guidelines related to DPAs. To
the extent that DPAs have allowed American prosecutors carte blanche to
threaten over-enforcement without the need for a complicated criminal
trial, they are less likely to have that effect in Canada, simply due to the
more nuanced liability standard for corporate criminal mens rea required by
sections 22.1 and 22.2. Corporations that feel like they could beat criminal
charges under those provisions are less likely to agree to remediation
agreements where the evidence suggests that the Crown would not be able
to prove the necessary elements at trial. The availability of such agreements
is, however, far more likely to exacerbate the more pressing problem of
under-enforcement. If prosecutors are already reluctant to bring charges
against corporations due to the complicated discovery process such trials
entail, it stands to reason that they will be even less likely to do so with an
easier option at hand. Attention to victim harm — not only by prosecutors
and courts, but by the public in general — may prove an important buffer
against such a risk.
At the end of the day, Canadian criminal enforcement against
corporations remains in a state of ferment. The 2004 amendments to the
Criminal Code came from a sudden public awareness of the nature of
corporate negligence and the material harms to victims it causes. The SNCLavalin affair has again thrown the specter of corporate lawlessness into the
public sphere. While not all cases of corporate crime have easy-to-identify
victims, where they exist, their narratives provide important evidence of the
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nature of corporate criminal harm. The expressive value of victim impact
statements in providing coherence to the project of corporate criminal
liability is particularly high in this ever-changing environment.
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